Security

edit

Markdown is often written by users: comments, descriptions, messages. CommonMark lets the author write raw HTML and any URL, so the HTML of such Markdown can run scripts in the pages of your site. Before you render untrusted Markdown, apply the measures below. The renderer options reduce what the author can write, but only an HTML sanitizer makes the HTML of untrusted Markdown safe: sanitize the HTML in every case.

Disable raw HTML

The renderer copies raw HTML to the output unchanged. DisableHtml reads it as text, which the renderer escapes. The URLs of the links are not filtered:

var markdown = "<script>alert(1)</script>\n\nSome <b>bold</b> text and [a link](javascript:alert(1))";

Assert.Equal("<script>alert(1)</script>\n<p>Some <b>bold</b> text and <a href=\"javascript:alert(1)\">a link</a></p>\n", MarkdownConverter.ToHtml(markdown));

// The HTML is written as text, but the URLs of the links are not filtered
var options = new MarkdownParseOptions { DisableHtml = true };
Assert.Equal("<p>&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;</p>\n<p>Some &lt;b&gt;bold&lt;/b&gt; text and <a href=\"javascript:alert(1)\">a link</a></p>\n", MarkdownConverter.ToHtml(markdown, options));

TagFilter, an extension of GitHub Flavored Markdown, escapes the tags that change how the rest of the page is read: title, textarea, style, xmp, iframe, noembed, noframes, script and plaintext. It keeps the other tags and their attributes, such as <img onerror=...>, and it can be bypassed: as in GitHub, it only recognizes a name followed by whitespace, > or />, while browsers also read <script/src=...> as a script. It is not a sanitizer:

var options = new MarkdownParseOptions { Extensions = MarkdownExtensions.TagFilter };
var tree = MarkdownSyntaxTree.ParseText("<div>\n<script/src=https://example.com/x.js></script>\n</div>\n", options);

// As in GitHub, a / after the name is not filtered: browsers read <script/src=...> as a script
Assert.Equal("<div>\n<script/src=https://example.com/x.js>&lt;/script>\n</div>\n", MarkdownHtmlRenderer.ToHtml(tree));

Limit the nesting

A few characters can nest many blocks or inlines: each > of a line starts a block quote, and each * can open an emphasis. A tree that deep would exhaust the stack of the code that walks it, the renderers and your visitors. MaximumNestingDepth, 128 by default, is the number of blocks that a block can be nested in, and of inlines that an inline can be nested in: a deeper block is text of a paragraph, and a deeper inline is text, so parsing never fails:

var markdown = new string('>', 10_000) + " text";

// The block quotes nested in more than 2 block quotes are text: the tree is 3 block quotes deep
var options = new MarkdownParseOptions { MaximumNestingDepth = 2 };
var tree = MarkdownSyntaxTree.ParseText(markdown, options);
Assert.HasCount(3, tree.GetRoot().DescendantNodes().OfType<MarkdownBlockQuoteSyntax>());
Assert.Equal(markdown, tree.GetRoot().ToFullString());

Filter the URL schemes

[link](javascript:alert(1)) produces a javascript: URL, with or without raw HTML. AllowedUrlSchemes lists the schemes that the URLs of the links and of the images can have. A URL with another scheme is written empty, and a relative URL is kept:

var tree = MarkdownSyntaxTree.ParseText("[a](javascript:alert(1)) [b](https://example.com) [c](/relative) ![d]() <vbscript:x>\n");
var options = new MarkdownHtmlRendererOptions { AllowedUrlSchemes = ["http", "https", "mailto"] };

// The URLs whose scheme is not allowed are written empty, the relative URLs are kept
Assert.Equal("<p><a href=\"\">a</a> <a href=\"https://example.com\">b</a> <a href=\"/relative\">c</a> <img src=\"\" alt=\"d\" /> <a href=\"\">vbscript:x</a></p>\n", MarkdownHtmlRenderer.ToHtml(tree, options));

The scheme is compared ignoring case, and read as a browser reads it: the spaces and the control characters at the start of the URL, and its tabs and line endings, are ignored. The filter applies to every URL that the renderer writes: links, images, autolinks, media links, and the URLs that node renderers write with WriteUrl. It does not apply to raw HTML, nor to the generic attributes that your AttributeFilter allows. It complements the sanitizer, it does not replace it.

Sanitize the HTML

Pass the HTML of untrusted Markdown through an HTML sanitizer, such as Meziantou.Framework.HtmlSanitizer, to remove the unsafe elements, URLs and attributes. The sanitizer never adds attributes: set LinkRel, such as nofollow ugc, on the renderer.

Keep generic attributes for trusted authors

GenericAttributes lets the author add attributes, such as {#id .class title="text"}. It is meant for trusted authors, such as the authors of your documentation: do not enable it for untrusted Markdown, or sanitize the HTML.

By default, AttributeFilter only writes the identifier, the classes and the attributes that describe the content, such as title, lang or aria-*. Event handlers, URL attributes, style, data-* and the directive attributes of client-side frameworks (x-init, hx-get...) can run a script or cover the page: do not allow them. An element has one attribute of each name: the attributes that the renderer writes, such as the alt of an image, the title of a link, or the rel of LinkRel, cannot be written again by generic attributes, and a generic attribute written twice keeps its first value.

The filter and the sanitizer still let some attributes through. With the default policy of the sanitizer:

  • Classes. The value of class is not checked: {.fixed-top .modal} uses the classes of your stylesheets to cover or restyle the page.
  • target and rel. Both are allowed: {target=_blank} opens a link in a new window, and, when the renderer writes no rel, {rel=opener} gives the opened page access to yours. Set LinkRel, which generic attributes cannot replace.
  • Identifiers. The sanitizer removes id by default. If you allow it, an identifier such as {#__proto__} or the name of a global variable can be confused with the objects of your scripts.